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CONTROLLING PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY BY THE CONTEMPT POWER:
THE BRITISH PRACTICE AND ITS PROSPECT IN AMERICAN LAW
I. Introduction
Recent, sensational criminal cases have engendered publicity so adverse
to a criminal defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial that judges have
been importuned by members of the bar to restrain newspaper excesses by the
use of the contempt power.' Whether American courts can constitutionally
curb press coverage of pretrial or trial proceedings that may prejudice a defen-
dant's right to a fair trial, and whether it would be desirable for them to do so,
are still open questions. In Britain, no such doubt exists, under English law,
as to the propriety of using this inherent judicial power to "safeguard the fair
administration of criminal justice by jury trial from mutilation or distortion by
extraneous influences."2
English courts have protected the integrity of their criminal process from
direct interference by parties before the courts through the instrumentality of
the contempt power since early common law.' Until the beginning of this cen-
tury, it was thought that the exercise of this summary power against constructive
contempts4 rested on the "same immemorial usage as supports the whole fabric
of the common law"; 5 but in fact the practice developed only in the eighteenth
century.' Lord Hardwicke, in the 1742 case of Roach v. Garvan, laid the
foundation for this practice in committing an editor to the Fleet for impugning
the characters of witnesses. While disregarding an objection that these actions
were proper matter for a libel suit rather than for the court's summary jurisdic-
tion, he stated that courts must punish publications that result in "prejudicing
1 Though their recommendations for avoiding prejudicial publicity are aimed primarily
at stopping dissemination of information by court officers, the ABA Advisory Committee has
also recommended that judges make a limited use of the contempt power:
(a) Against a person who, knowing that a criminal trial by jury is in progress or
that a jury is being selected for such a trial:
(i) disseminates by any means of public communication an extrajudicial state-
ment relating to the defendant or to the issues in the case that goes beyond
the public record of the court in the case, if the statement is reasonably cal-
culated to affect the outcome of the trial and seriously threatens to have such
an effect; or
(ii) makes such a statement with the expectation that it will be so dissem-
inated. ABA ADvisorY COMMITTEE ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PREss, STANDARIDS
RELATING TO FAIR TRIm.L AND FREE PRESS 150 (Tent. Draft 1966).
2 Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 920 (1950) (opinion of
Justice Frankfurter respecting the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari).
3 For a discussion of the early history of the contempt power, see GOLDFARB, THE, CON-
TmpT POWER 9-25 (1963).
4 Constructive contempts are those criminal contempts committed out of the presence
of the court which obstruct the administration of justice. See Goodhart, Newspapers and
Contempt of Court in English Law, 48 H~Av. L. REv. 885, 886 (1935).
5 Fox, The King v. Almon, 24 L.Q. REv. 184, 185 (1908). Until proven historically
unsound by Sir John Fox in Fox, supra at 184 and 266, this statement from Lord Wilmoes
unpublished opinion in Rex v. Almon, [1765] Wm.moT's NOTEs 243 (1802), was authority
in both England and the United States. See GOLDFARB, op. cit. supra note 3, at 19-20.
6 English courts -had the power to punish interference by strangers out of the presence
of the court before that time, but the usual procedure was by indictment, information, or
action at law for libel. See Fox, supra note 5, at 270.
7 2 Atk. 469, 26 Eng. Rep. 683 (Ch. 1742).
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mankind against persons before the case is heard . . . ," and that they must
do so to "keep the streams of justice clear and pure, that parties may proceed
with safety both to themselves and their characters."9
The power of constructive contempt has been used frequently by modem
English courts to preserve the "stream of justice" from pollution by newspaper
publications that tend to interfere with the administration of criminal justice."
In these cases, an offending newspaper is not punished, as it would first seem to
an American familiar with defendant-centered remedies, because its publication
has prejudiced the individual criminal defendant." Rather, the contempt is
that the paper has obstructed the administration of justice and injured the court
by depriving it "of the power of doing that which is the end for which it exists-
namely, to administer justice duly, impartially, and with reference solely to the
facts judicially brought before it."' 2
II. British Contempt Procedure
Although theoretically contempt is an offense against the process of criminal
justice, English courts do not proceed against newspapers on their own motion."
The individual defendant in a pending criminal proceeding, who believes his
right to a fair trial has been prejudiced by newspaper publicity, initiates prose-
cution against the offending paper. 4 The aggrieved party applies directly, or
requests the Attorney General to apply on his behalf," to a Queen's Bench
Divisional Court' 6 for a writ of attachment for contempt.' Then the court,
by a judgment based on all the circumstances at the time of publication, de-
termines whether the newspaper is guilty of contempt.' The form and content
of the offending article, the circulation of the paper in which it appeared, and
the state of the proceedings against the accused at the time of its publication
are factors in this judgment. 9 The question of liability is judged by an objective
8 Id. at 471, 26 Eng. Rep. at 685.
9. Ibid.
10 Though many of the early uses of constructive contempt involved punishing personal
attacks on judges, the rationale for punishment was the same: "to prevent undue interference
with the administration of justice." Rex v. Davies, [1906] 1 K.B. 32, 40 (1905).
11 E.g., Regina v. Evening Standard Co., [1954] 1 Q.B. 578, 583-84; Rex v. Parke,
[1903] 2 K.B. 432, 436-37; Regina v. Balfour-Re Stead, 11 T.L.R. 492, 493 (Q.B.D. 1895).
12 Rex v. Parke, supra note 11, at 437.
13 See Gillmor, Free Press and Fair Trial in English Law, 22 WAsH. & LEE L. R.v. 17,
18-20 (1965).
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid. This practice has, in recent cases, been preferred over application by private
counsel, see Brief for Attorney General as Amicus Curiae, Regina v. Duffy, [1960] 2 Q.B.
188, 192. Proceeding by private counsel has the advantage, however, that as advisers to the
defendant in the criminal proceeding, they would be best able to seek the application without
prejudicing the defendant's eventual defense. See Contempt Of Court, 207 L.T. 225, 227
(1949).
16 Gillmor, supra note 13, at 19. All branches of the High Court of England have the
power to punish contempts against themselves. See Goodhart, supra note 4, at 909. Queen's
Bench Division Courts, however, have exclusive jurisdiction over constructive contempts
arising out of criminal proceedings before those courts and out of those committed during
preliminary hearings.
17 An attachment is essentially a committal to prison. See Goodhart, supra note 4, at
908.




standard. Therefore, that the publication did not, in fact, interfere with the
fair administration of the criminal proceeding is irrelevant2 Under this rigidly
objective standard a paper was held in contempt even though the accused had
been acquitted.2
If the court finds that the article had a reasonable tendency to interfere
with the impartial administration of justice, it will summarily order the editor,
reporter, publisher, or any other person responsible for the publication to appear
before the court. Unless cause can be shown why such persons or their paper
should not be punished- by convincing the court that no contempt was com-
mitted- a prison sentence, fine, or both will be imposed. If the damage is
slight, the court can nominally tax the paper the costs of the proceedings.22
Thus, the severity of the sentence imposed is entirely within the discretion of the
court. Although in early constructive contempt cases, those found guilty of
contempt were imprisoned for terms as long as three years,23 recently, prison
sentences have been imposed only in cases of exceptional abuse 4
III. Comment Found to Be Contempt
English law is settled that any newspaper comment calculated to prejudice
pending criminal proceedings will be punished as contempt.2 The courts,
moreover, have given a broad definition to the type of newspaper "comment"
that will be classified as contempt, and to when proceedings are "pending"
for contempt purposes.
Reporting information not accepted into evidence at the trial" and com-
menting on the personal character and prior criminal record of an accused,"
both recognized as having a dangerous tendency to "try" cases in the news-
papers rather than in a court of law, have been punished as contempt. Similarly,
expressing an opinion as to the results of a pending trial has been considered
by English judges to be "comment" tending to prejudice an accused."
An extreme example of prejudicial publicity, severely dealt with by an
English court, concerned the murder trial of John Haigh in 19499 Haigh,
who had been charged with the acid-bath murder of an elderly woman, was
described by a series of newspaper articles as a human vampire, with lurid reasons
20 See Rex v. Daily Mirror, [1927] 1 KB. 845. In this case a newspaper was punished
with contempt for printing a photograph of a person charged with a crime when it was
"apparent to a reasonable man that a question of identity," id. at 850, might arise. None of
the witnesses who identified the accused had, in fact, seen the photograph. Identity, more-
over, was not in issue at the trial. Rex v. Daily Mirror, supra.
21 Regina v. Evening Standard Co., [1954] 1 Q.B. 578.
22 See Goodhart, supra note 4, at 909.
23 See Rex v. White, 1 Campb. 359, 170 Eng. Rep. 985 (N.P. 1808).
24 See Rex v. Bolam, 93 SOL. J. 220 (1949). Until recently, the sentence imposed was
final. Parliament now provides a statutory right of appeal in contempt cases. Administration
of Justice Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 65, § 13.
25 Cowen, Prejudicial Publicity and the Fair Trial: A Comparative Examination of
American, English and Commonwealth Law, 41 IND. L.J. 69, 76 (1965).
26 See Rex v. Tibbits, [1902] 1 K.B. 77 (1901).
27 See Rex v. Davies, [1906] 1 K.B. 32 (1905).
28 Rex v. Balfour-Re Stead, 11 T.L.R. 492 (Q.B.D. 1895).
29 Rex v. Bolam, 93 SOL. J. 220 (1949). A full account of the case appears in the
appendix to Justice Frankfurter's opinion concerning the denial of certiorari in Maryland
v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 930-32 (1950).
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given for that description. Though Haigh had been charged with only one
murder, the articles said he had been charged with several and went on to list
the names of his other "victims." Lord Goddard, while denouncing the paper's
conduct as pandering to sensationalism, sentenced the editor to three months
in prison and fined the newspaper £10,000.0 He concluded with an ominous
warning.
If for the purpose of increasing the circulation of their paper they should
again venture to publish such matter as this, the directors themselves might
find that the arm of the Court was long enough to reach them and to deal
with them individually.
3 '
To an American press, restricted only by the recently liberalized law of
libel 2 and by its own sense of responsibility, 3 the English decision of Rex v.
Astor 4 would seem like "draconian control."'" It illustrates how careful English
newspapers must be to avoid contempt convictions for comment tending to
prejudice a criminal trial. In this case, the court held that the mere arrange-
ment of two news items next to each other was contempt. The first item gave
an account of a civil proceeding concerning a share transaction, while the second
covered a criminal prosecution relating to this same transaction. The jury in
the criminal case, the court reasoned, upon reading the articles in question,
might be unduly influenced against the accused.
IV. When a Proceeding Is Pending for Contempt Purposes
English courts have jurisdiction to punish such comments only when they
are published during a pending criminal proceeding.16 A proceeding is pending
for contempt purposes even though trial has not yet begun. In Rex v. Parke,"7
Justice Wills, while punishing press comment published during preliminary
hearings, reconciled earlier cases that seemed to require that a criminal case be
at trial before a court could have jurisdiction to punish for contempt.
It is true that in very nearly all the cases which have arisen there has been
a cause actually begun, so that the expression, [that a case is pending] quite
30 Rex v. Bolam, supra note 29.
31 Id. at 220. See also Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 932
(1950).
32 Cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
33 American news media representatives have deplored any direct or indirect restraint
on news reporting, stating that any evil that might exist can be curbed by voluntary codes.
See comment of CBS President, Dr. Frank Stanton, Justice and the News Media, Trial,
Dec.-Jan., 1966, p. 40. For a discussion of voluntary codes which have proven unsuccessful,
see Note, Community Hostility and the Right to an Impartial Jury, 60 COLU M. L. Rav. 349,
372 n.138 (1960).
English newspapers, though already policed by the contempt power, have engaged in
self-regulation through a voluntary press council. One practice, evidently beyond the atten-
tion or reach of the courts, which the council has condemned is "checkbook journalism,"
which is the practice of making story contracts with witnesses engaged in pending proceed-
ings. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1966, p. 15, col. 1.
34 30 T.L.R. 10 (K.B.D. 1913).
35 See Goldfarb, Ensuring Fair Trial: The Impropriety of Publicity, The New Republic,
Feb. 29, 1964, p. 12.
36 See Cowen, supra note 25, at 76
37 [1903] 2 K.B. 432.
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natural under the circumstances, accentuates the fact, not that the case
has been begun, but that it is not at an end. That is the cardinal considera-
tion. It is possible very effectually to poison the fountain of justice before
it begins to flow. 8
Later cases pushed the time during which a case is pending and thus the period
during which a newspaper is subject to contempt back to the time of a suspect's
arrest.3 9 Whether a court can exercise jurisdiction before proceedings can be
said to have been initiated by an arrest, as when the suspect's arrest is only
imminent, has yet to be decided by an English court."'
A criminal case is still pending for contempt purposes until the time for
bringing notice of appeal has expired, or until an appeal has been finally heard,41
because the possibility exists that a new jury, susceptible to prejudicial com-
ments, might be empaneled upon the granting of a new trial."
On appeal, however, the question of an alleged contempt is only whether
the publication tends to prejudice the proceeding then pending -the appeal."
A comment which might prejudice a juryman likely would not have the same
effect upon a judge. The language in a recent case' that refused an attach-
ment for contempt on appeal, moreover, indicates that no comment, short of
a "deliberate campaign to influence the decision of the appellate tribunal"' 5
will be considered contempt.
V. Intent Not Required
One of the severest aspects of English constructive contempt law is that a
newspaper can be in contempt even though it had no intention to interfere
with the administration of justice. 6 An early English case determined that
intent is not a necessary element of the offense. In Roach v. Garvan,4" Lord
Hardwicke answered a defense that a publisher did not know the content of
a contemptuous article:
38 Id. at 438.
39 Rex v. Editor, 40 T.L.R. 833 (K.B.D. 1924); Rex v. Clarke, 103 L.T.R. 636 (K.B.D.
1910).
40 Professor Goodhart wrote in 1935 that he thought it "almost certain that the courts
would not hesitate to take this step if they felt that the administration of justice had been
interfered with." Goodhart, supra note 4, at 890-91. The problem is rooted in the rationale
for punishing contempts - whether the offense is against the administration of justice gen-
erally, or whether it is an interference with a particular proceeding. See Note, Contempt of
Court When Proceedings Imminent, 80 L.Q. Rxv. 166 (1964). Commonwealth courts that
have considered the problem are divided. See Cowen, supra note 25, at 77.
41 Rex v. Davies, [1945] 1 K.B. 435.
42 The awarding of a de novo trial on appeal in England is rare. Regina v. Duffy,
[1960] 2 Q.B. 188, 198.
43 Id. at 197.
44 In a recent case Lord Parker questioned how vulnerable English judges might be to
such comments. In refusing an attachment for contempt, he said: "A judge is in a very
different position to a juryman. Though in no sense superhuman, he has by his training
no difficulty in putting out of his mind matters which are not evidence in the case." Id.
at 198.
45 Id. at 197.
46 Goodhart, supra note 4, at 906-07; Note, Contempt by Publication: The Limitation
on Indirect Contempt of Court, 48 VA. L. REv. 556, 567 (1962).
47 2 Atk. 469, 26 Eng. Rep. 683 (Ch. 1742).
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But though it is true, this is a trade, yet they must take care to do it
with prudence and caution; for if they print any thing that is libellous,
it is no excuse, to say, that the printer had no knowledge -of the contents,
and was entirely ignorant of its being libellous .... 4s
Thus, newspapers are held strictly liable for the content of the articles
appearing within their pages. As the scope of newspaper coverage expanded,
it became impossible for those in charge to have personal knowledge of the
circumstances of each news story.
4 9
As a result of this increased coverage, the burden of strict responsibility for
the possibly prejudicial nature of articles correspondingly increased, sometimes
with harsh results.
In Regina v. Evening Standard Co.,"0 an otherwise reliable reporter left
the courtroom to telephone an account of the trial to his paper. In the interim
he missed part of a witness' testimony. In the court's judgment, the resulting
distorted account tended to prejudice the accused's trial. Though the court
accepted the good faith of the reporter and recognized the fact that his editor
had no reason to suspect the inaccuracy, the newspaper was nonetheless fined
£1,000 for the contempt."
Some doubt existed, however, that a newspaper would be punished for
contempt, if, without any negligence on its part, it was ignorant of the fact
that criminal proceedings were pending. 2 But in 1956, the case of Regina v.
Odhans Press5" resolved this question by holding a newspaper liable for pub-
lishing articles that the court later found to be a contempt, regardless of what
care the paper had exercised in reporting. The test to be applied in newspaper
contempt cases, Lord Goddard said, is completely objective, weighing only the
article's reasonable tendency to interfere with the administration of justice.5
That a reporter and editor were subjectively ignorant of the fact that proceed-
ings were pending, could, therefore, not be a defense.5
The following year this strict standard was applied to magazine distribu-
tors with even harsher results." During an internationally sensational murder
trial, copies of Newsweek magazine carrying comments improper by English
standards were circulated in London. When charged with responsibility for
the publication," the distributors pleaded the defamation defense of innocent
dissemination - that they had no reason to suspect the propriety of the publi-
cation. The court rejected the analogy between defamation and constructive
contempt. The distributors, like newspaper publishers, were held to be abso-
lutely liable for contempt. 9
48 Id. at 472, 26 Eng. Rep. at 685; Ex parte Green, 7 T.L.R. 411 (Q.B. 1891).
49 Note, supra note 46, at 567-68.
50 [1954] 1 Q.B. 578.
51 Ibid.
52 See Goodhart, supra note 4, at 907.
53 [1957] 1 Q.B. 73 (1956).
54 Id. at 80.
55 Ibid.
56 Regina v. Griffiths, [1957] 2 Q.B. 192.
57 Newsweek's only representative in England was its chief European correspondent, who,
the court felt, could not be held responsible for the contempt. Id. at 202.
58 See generally PROSSER, TORTS § 108, at 794 (3d ed. 1964).
59 Regina v. Griffiths, [1957] 2 Q.B. 192, 203-04.
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Reaction to these extensions of contempt control over the news industry,
from both the English press 0 and bar,61 was vehement. Parliament responded
to these protests by passing the Administration of Justice Act of 1960,62 which
eliminated strict liability as the standard in such contempt cases. The statute
provides that it would be a defense if a newspaper's personnel, at the time of
publication, "did not know and had no reason to suspect that the proceedings
were pending."6 Distributors were similarly relieved of responsibility, if, having
exercised reasonable care, they were ignorant of a publication's tendency to
prejudice a fair trial. Although intent is still not a required element for con-
structive contempt, the new standard requires at least some negligence in not
knowing that an action is pending. In that respect it has greatly decreased the
newspaper's burden and has kept contempt from seriously inhibiting worthwhile
reporting.
VI. Reporting of Preliminary Hearings
Through the vigorous application of contempt, English judges have been
successful in curbing the flagrantly prejudicial effects that newspaper comment
can have on pending proceedings. The detailed reporting of preliminary hearings,
however, a more subtle, but nonetheless damaging source of prejudice to crim-
inal defendants, has remained out of the reach of the contempt power.
Though the legality of reporting the details of preliminary hearings before
examining magistrates was doubtful at one time,65 the Law of Libel Amend-
ment Act of 188866 made a "fair and accurate" newspaper account privileged.
As a result, newspapers can freely publish information under the guise of a
report, which, had it been gratuitous comment, might well have supported an
attachment for contempt. Since magistrate's courts are not considered "open"'
under English law, the public, including the press, has no right to be present.
Magistrates theoretically have the power to order hearings held in camera when
to do so will best serve the ends of justice.6 Although this procedure, by itself,
would effectively curtail the reporting of preliminary hearings and its attendant
abuses, magistrates have rarely exercised this discretion.6 9
The dangers of reporting preliminary hearings lie within the nature of
60 See Inglis, Contempt of Court, The Spectator, Jan. 17, 1958, pp. 68-69.
61 See Note, 73 L.Q. R.v. 8 (1957); Note, Innocent Distributors and Contempt of Court,
73 L.Q. Rav. 467 (1957); Note, Unintentional Contempt of Court, 20 MODERN L. REv. 275
(1957).
62 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, C. 65.
63 See Administration of Justice Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 65, § 11(1).
64 See Administration of Justice Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 65, § 11(2).
65 Until 1848 preliminary hearings in England were viewed as serving inquisitorial func-
tions, rather than acting as protection for an accused. Publication of depositions taken at
those hearings, at which the accused had no right to be present, was objected to because
it gave the defendant knowledge of the prosecution's evidence. For an excellent discussion
of the development of preliminary hearings in England, see Geis, Preliminary Hearings and
the Press, 8 U.C.L.A.L. Rvv. 397, 399-401 (1961).
66 51 & 52 Vict., c. 64, §§ 3-4.
67 The Indictable Offenses Act, 1848, 11 & 12 Vict., c. 42, § 19.
68 Magistrate's Court Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 55, § 4(2).
69 One English writer suggests that the reason for this reluctance is that the magistrates
are generally active in local politics and are "reluctant to renounce the spotlight." Note, The
Aftermath of the Adams Case, 20 MODERN L. REv. 387, 390 (1957).
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the hearings themselves. Preliminary hearings," theoretically designed to save
persons from frivolous prosecution, have become, to the defense, a valuable
means of discovering the prosecution's case. 1 While the prosecutor must intro-
duce sufficient evidence to justify committal, the practice of English defense
counsel is to reveal as little of its evidence as possible before trial."' Therefore,
a detailed report of the hearing necessarily presents to the public a one-sided
picture of the case that is slanted against the accused. These accounts, more-
over, will often contain evidence that, though unsuccessfully objected to at the
hearing, will later be ruled inadmissible by the trial judge.7 3 Evidence of prior
convictions or criminal associations, properly heard by a magistrate on the
question of bail, would likewise be excluded under trial standards.
The result of this reporting in sensational cases is that the newspapers
report every minute detail of these hearings, spread these details before poten-
tial jurors, and effectively prejudice the accused even before he is committed
for trial.7 4
A recent controversial trial graphically demonstrates the dangers of preju-
dice inherent in this type of reporting. At the preliminary hearing in the mur-
der trial of Dr. John Bodkin Adams in 1957,"5 the prosecution introduced evi-
dence that several of the doctors patients had died under mysterious circum-
stances. A defense request for a private hearing on this evidence was denied.'
When the doctor was subsequently committed for only one murder, it became
certain that evidence of the other deaths would not be admissible at his trial.
The widespread detailed reporting of the preliminary hearing had created an
atmosphere so grossly prejudicial to the defendant that a fair trial was made
impossible.
77
In response to the abuses exemplified by the Adams case, a parliamentary
committee, headed by Lord Tucker, was appointed to consider possible remedies.
The committee reported that an increased use of in camera proceedings would
not be satisfactory. Not only was there a "general distaste for the idea of
justice being administered in a court of law behind locked doors,"79 but it was
also questioned whether the magistrates' demonstrated reluctance to sitting in
camera could be overcome." As a solution, the Committee proposed that press
reporting of preliminary hearings be restricted in two ways: if an accused were
70 For a thorough discussion of the preliminary hearing in modern English criminal
procedure, see DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 106-19 (1958).
71 Id. at 112-13.
72 Id. at 110.
73 Id. at 118.
74 One English writer, in comparing the abuses of American newspaper trial reporting
with the evils resulting from English reporting of preliminary hearings, commented: "There
is little doubt that in both countries the interests of the individuals have been sacrificed to
the public's thirst for sensation and that the freedom of the press has been confused with
license." Gower & Price, The Profession and Practice of the Law in England and America,
20 MODERN L. REv. 317, 341 (1957).
75 Because Dr. Adams was eventually acquitted, his trial was not officially reported. For
a full account of the case, see Palmer, Dr. Adams' Trial for Murder, 1957 CRIM. L. Rav. 365.
76 Note, supra note 69.
77 See Geis, supra note 65, at 402.
78 Departmental Committee on Proceedings Before Examining Justices, GMD. No. 479,
at 19 (1958).
79 Id. at 9.
80 Id. at 19.
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discharged at the hearing, an account of the proceedings would remain privileged;
if he were committed, only a description of the name, charge, and decision of
the court would be permitted until the trial's conclusion."' Thus, press reporting
of the hearing would not be completely prohibited, only delayed.
After a period of parliamentary inaction on the Tucker Committee's recom-
mendations, new impetus for reform resulted from the prejudicial publicity caused
by the reporting of the preliminary hearing in the trial of Dr. Stephen Ward 2
- an offshoot of the notorious Profumo scandal. A restriction similar to the
Committee's recommendation recently was given preliminary approval by the
House of Commons. 3 If enacted, this legislation would effectively eliminate
the one source of prejudicial press publicity not policed by the contempt jurisdic-
tion of English courts. This proposed reform, moreover, will make one criticism of
the English approach to the problem of prejudicial publicity in criminal pro-
ceedings no longer completely valid. The author of this charge, Australian
Zelman Cowen, recently criticized the fact that although English courts, unlike
those in America, readily strike at the source of prejudicial publicity after it occurs,
they do little to remedy its effects on the individual defendant whose right to a
fair trial has been damaged. 4 In Cowen's words:
The English law is unsatisfactory because it apparently loses interest in the
prejudicial effect of what is published by the media once the offending
publisher has been punished for contempt. But, like John Brown's body,
the prejudice goes marching on, and unlike the American law, the English
law gives us no ground to believe that this may lead to the reversal of con-
victions.8 5
The argument, in American terminology, is that it is a hollow victory"8 for the
criminal defendant that the "poisoner" T of the "stream of justice" is punished,
when he is denied his constitutional right to a fair trial.
If the reporting of preliminary hearings is restricted, as appears likely,
the only method of reporting, under English law, capable of generating prej-
udicial publicity that is widespread and comprehensive enough to seriously
threaten the impartiality of a defendant's trial will be prohibited. Thus the lack of
reversals in English criminal trials will no longer be a serious issue, since publicity
that is prejudicial enough to bias a jury will not exist.
Conceivably, newspapers could flout the statutory restriction on the report-
ing of preliminary hearings, but this seems unlikely given the "elevated" sense
of responsibility of the English press."8 It is also admitted that individual in-
81 Id. at 24.
82 See generally, KENNEDY, THE TRAL OF STEPHEN WARD (1964); Cowen, Prejudicial
Publicity and the Fair Trial: A Comparative Examination of American, English and Com-
monwealth Law, 41 IND. L.J. 69, 81-82 (1965).
83 Letter from Mr. Anthony Lewis, Chief London Correspondent, New York Times, to
the Nom DAa IvWYER, March 7, 1967, on file in the office of the NOTRE DAME LAWYER.
84 Cowen, supra note 82, at 83.
85 Ibid.
86 One American commentator has voiced a criticism similar to Cowen's. See GOLDFARB,
THE CONTEMPT Powm 88 (1963).
87 See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 730 (1961) (concurring opinion).
88 See Goldfarb, Public Information, Criminal Trials and the Cause Celebre, 36 N.Y.U.L.
Rnv. 810, 827 (1961).
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stances of pretrial and trial comment "calculated to prejudice a fair trial""
may still occur. But these, if English contempt law continues to operate as it
has, will be quickly punished. As a result, newspaper publicity will be unable
to generate a sustained atmosphere of prejudice likely to influence jurors or
potential jurors.
In cases where some prejudicial publicity appears, a voir dire can be used
to eliminate the potential jurors who are exposed to this publicity. Though use
of this procedural safeguard is as rare in England as it is commonplace in the
United States,"0 its use has been strongly recommended by Justice Devlin.91 By
use of the voir dire, the comparatively slight risk of harm, from prejudicial pub-
licity, which will be left remaining after the adoption of a restriction on the
ieporting of preliminary hearings can successfully be eliminated.
VII. The Use of Contempt in the United States
With the exception of the abuses created by the reporting of preliminary
hearings, English courts have been successful in combating the effects of prej-
udicial newspaper publicity upon their criminal process.92 The dilemma in
American law is to find a workable method of securing criminal trials from
prejudicial publicity while at the same time preserving freedom of the press.
In this context, one wonders if American courts can pattern their use of the
contempt power after the English model to curb press publications that threaten
the right of criminal defendants to an impartial trial.
Undoubtedly, the greatest obstacle in American law preventing the use of
the contempt power, as employed by judges, is the first amendment. English
law has had little difficulty in restricting newspaper coverage of criminal pro-
ceedings in the interest of the fair administration of justice.93 The Constitution
and the heritage of a completely free and uninhibited press, however, make the
prospect of employing similar measures in this country doubtful.
Recent Supreme Court decisions have reaffirmed, more pointedly than
ever, a commitment to the principle that the first amendment rights of freedom
of speech94 and freedom of the press95 are "pre-eminent" in American constitu-
tional law. It thus would be within a tenuous framework that any restriction
upon the freedom of the American press would have to operate.
At the same time, recent gross interferences by the press in the adminis-
tration of American criminal justice 0 have threatened to "try" defendants "by
89 Rex v. Daily Mirror, [1927] 1 K.B. 845, 850.
90 See DRvLIN, TRIAL By JURY 30-32 (1956).
91 Id. at 31.
92 See Harvey, Fair Trial v. Free Press - A British Lawyer's View, 42 L.A.B. BULL.
109 (1967).
93 Judge Oliver's comments concluding Rex v. Davies [1945] 1 K.B. 435, 446, are blunt,
but exemplary:
Much is said to-day about the freedom of the press, and I only wish to point out
that our decision in this case comes to no more than this: that everything the public
has a right to know about a trial of the kind with which we are here concerned,
that is to say, everything that has taken place in open court, may be published, and
beyond that there is no need or right to go.
94 See generally Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
95 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
96 See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
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newspaper" rather than before an impartial jury. At least one writer has called
the "preferred status" of the first amendment into question by challenging the
press to prove itself of "significant social value"' in its reporting of criminal
trials, or else be restricted in the interest of safeguarding rights "equally en-
shrined in the Constitution.""8
American courts,99 theoretically, can exercise the power of constructive
contempt against newspapers in a manner consistent with the first amendment,
but only if the conduct punished thereby presents a "clear and present danger"
to the administration of justice. This test, laid down as a "minimum compul-
sion of the bill of rights" on the states by the Supreme Court in Bridges v.
California, '0 has proven nebulous, defying definition.'' Negatively, it can be
said, with some certainty, that newspaper articles criticizing judges,' and
letters to grand jurors to the same effect,' do not involve a "clear and present
danger." The Supreme Court, however, has not, while reviewing state contempt
convictions, decided whether prejudicial publicity surrounding a criminal trial
presents such an imminent threat. In the one case which presented the question
to them, the Court denied certiorari. 4 In this 1949 case, a Baltimore trial
court held a local radio station in contempt for broadcasting reports of the
capture, confessions, and prior criminal record of a Negro charged with the
brutal murder of an eleven-year-old white girl. The broadcasts, which con-
tained a grisly account of the discovery of the butcher-knife murder weapon
and also reported the defendant's admission of a prior rape of a white woman,
created an atmosphere so hostile to the defendant that his counsel felt compelled
to waive a jury trial.'
Reversing the contempt conviction, the Maryland Court of Appeals held
that the broadcasts did not present such a clear and present danger as to meet
the first amendment test.' When the Supreme Court denied certiorari, Justice
Frankfurter wrote an opinion carefully explaining that the denial implied neither
approval nor disapproval of the court of appeals' judgment. 7 Thus, whether
prejudicial publicity reaching a jury in a criminal trial is a clear and present
danger to the administration of justice, which would allow a court to use the
contempt power to deal with it, is still an open question.
Though the Court has recently demonstrated an increasing awareness of
97 Will, Free Press vs. Fair Trial, 12 DE PAUL L. REv. 197, 200 (1963).
98 Ibid.
99 The power to punish constructive contempts has been prohibited in federal courts
by statute. 18 U.S.C. 401 (1958). For the early history of that law and its turbulent be-
ginnings, see Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication in the United States, 28 COLUM. L.
REv. 401, 525 (1928). For a concise treatment of its subsequent history, see Note, Contempt
by Publication: The Limitation on Indirect Contempt of Court, 48 VA. L. REv. 556, 558-560
(1962).
100 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941).
101 See Note, supra note 99, at 561.
102 Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
103 Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
104 Baltimore Radio Show, Inc. v. State, 193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497, cert. denied, 338
U.S. 912, 920 (1950).
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
107 Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912 (1950).
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the harmful effects of prejudicial publicity on the impartiality of criminal trials, 0 s
this should not be taken as an indication that a direct restraint on the press
would now be favored. The most recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court
on this subject, in Sheppard v. Maxwell,' 9 if it is authority for any one principle,
appears as a judgment that the traditional procedural safeguards, which stop
short of direct restraints, can guarantee a fair trial.
VIII. Conclusion
The quality of English newspaper reporting has not become "tepid""10
under the restraints imposed by the use of the contempt power. English news-
papers must, nevertheless, exercise caution in what they report. In a country
noted for the efficiency of it civil servants, the honesty and professionalism of
its police and judges,"' and its comparative freedom from the evils of organized
crime,".2 the caution thus imposed has not proven socially harmful.
In America, the idea of punishing newspapers for publications that a judge
reflectively considers likely to prejudice a fair trial, would be, if not constitution-
ally invalid, fatally objectionable on grounds of social policy and tradition. The
press, in the United States, plays an important public role as an instrument
of social reform. Moreover, it serves a "watchdog" function on corruption in
government, police, and the courts. If its reporting is inhibited by the threat
of the contempt power imposed at the discretion of judges, newspapers will not
properly fulfill this necessary function. Although the English use of contempt
is appealing because of its success, it must be rejected in this country as a means
guaranteeing the fair criminal trial demanded by the sixth amendment.
John Scripp
108 See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S.
723 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
109 See Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra note 108.
110 See Lewis, British Verdict on Trial-by-Press, N.Y. Times, June 20, 1965, § 6 (Mag-
azine), p. 15.
111 Jaffe, Trial by Newspaper, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 504, 512 (1965).
112 DEVLiN, op. cit. supra note 70, at 134. But see The South Bend Tribune, Mar. 5,
1967, p. 16, col. 4.
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